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Preempting Justice:  
“Precrime” in Fiction and in Fact 
Mark C. Niles† 
[W]e get them first, before they can commit an act of violence.  So
the commission of the crime itself is absolute metaphysics. We
claim they’re culpable. They, on the other hand, eternally claim
they’re innocent. And, in a sense, they are innocent. In our society
we have no major crimes, but we do have a detention camp full of
would-be criminals.1
That which keeps us safe will also keep us free.2 
I. INTRODUCTION
In the opening scene of Steven Spielberg’s 2002 film adaptation of Philip
K. Dick’s short story The Minority Report,3 we see stylistically edited,
disjointed images that appear to depict a man murdering two lovers. It is
soon made clear that the images are the video representations of
precognitive predictions of a future crime that were made by members of a
futuristic crime prevention agency.
Later in the film, we see the same man, at home with his wife—the 
woman he is shown murdering in the earlier images—and it becomes clear 
that we are watching the last few moments before the predicted murder. 
While retrieving the daily paper, the husband notices a familiar man 
standing in the park across the street from the house and becomes 
suspicious.  Instead of leaving for work as he normally would, he hides 
behind a tree after leaving the house and watches his wife open the door to 
let this man inside. Unnoticed, the husband follows his wife and her lover 
upstairs, hiding while they have sex. When he finally reveals himself, he 
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picks up the scissors we have already seen him kill the lovers with, but he is 
grabbed from behind by the chief of the crime prevention unit just before he 
lunges at his wife.4 The police enter the bedroom, and the husband is 
quickly taken into custody. The chief tells the man: “By mandate of the 
District of Columbia Precrime Division, I am placing you under arrest for 
the future-murder of [your wife and her lover] to take place today, April 
22nd, at 0800 hours and four minutes.” The man responds, “No, I didn’t do 
anything. . . . I wasn’t going to do anything!”  
Later, we see the man has been taken to a detention facility that houses 
other pre-murderers, all encased in individual glass cells, in a state of 
permanent suspended animation, forced to eternally relive the video 
predictions of the crimes they would have committed. 
The Minority Report’s fictional, futuristic depiction of a law enforcement 
unit that prevents predicted crimes before they occur, fanciful as it might 
seem, bears a striking resemblance to post-9/11 law enforcement and 
national security policies implemented by the United States government.5 
On June 23, 2006, in Miami, Florida, for example, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) arrested seven men who belonged to what was 
described as “a homegrown terrorist cell.”6 The federal officials asserted 
that the accused individuals—who would come to be known as the “Liberty 
City Seven”7—intended to carry out domestic terrorist activities, including a 
“plan” to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, Illinois.8  
However, at a news conference (attended by scores of reporters and 
providing the lead story for local and national newscasts throughout the 
United States), FBI officials readily acknowledged that the supposed 
terrorists had never met with, nor had any contact with, any domestic or 
international terrorist organization, nor had they obtained any explosives or 
explosive devices.9 The Deputy FBI Director referred to the plan to attack 
the Sears Tower as “aspirational rather than operational.”10 Indeed, the 
“terrorists” were identified as the result of an FBI sting operation in which 
an agent, posing as a terrorist, contacted the suspects in order to develop a 
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relationship with them that could facilitate their prosecution.11 The arrests 
were made only after the nascent plan “had largely petered out because of 
organizational problems,” and presumably, there was no longer any hope 
that the “terrorists” might actually commit an overt act.12 The Washington 
Post observed that the “case underscores the murkiness that has been 
common to many of the government’s terrorism-related prosecutions since 
the Sept[ember] 11, 2001, attacks, cases that often hinge on ill-formed plots 
or debatable connections to terrorism.”13 
After two mistrials, four of the seven men were convicted of providing 
material support for terrorism,14 while two others were acquitted of all 
charges.15 In November 2009, the “leader” of the group was sentenced to 
thirteen and one-half years in prison.16 
Viewing these policies through the prism of this science-fiction morality 
tale provides an intriguing foundation to address the vexing questions raised 
by the preemptive law enforcement procedures increasingly imposed within 
this country and in its dealings with foreign nations. These questions 
include: What level of certainty that a crime or other dangerous act is on the 
verge of being committed will justify apprehension and prosecution of a 
would-be criminal? What level of fallibility in the predictive process will be 
acceptable to the law enforcement community and the public at large? And 
what kind of punishment, if any, is appropriate for someone who is 
prevented from committing a crime, even if we are sure that he or she 
would have done so absent the intervention? 
The short story, The Minority Report, relies on a darkly dystopian future 
that bears limited familiarity to the modern world, while the film version 
enhances verisimilitude and credibility with a tantalizingly familiar image 
of our near future. In the short story, the “precrime” technology is depicted 
as impeccable and ultimately immune from human attempts to undermine 
its effectiveness and impact, while in the film, the system is successfully 
circumvented (and ultimately destroyed) by the depravity and corruption of 
its own cocreator.17 
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The two stories differ significantly in their attitude toward the questions 
posed by this article. The short story, written ten years after World War II 
ended, expresses little doubt or concern with the notion that future criminals 
might be identified and incarcerated indefinitely before they have a chance 
to commit their crimes. On the other hand, the film, released immediately 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ultimately rejects the propriety of such a 
predictive system and of the means of punishment. These differences may 
say something interesting about the different eras when these stories were 
produced, about those responsible for their production, or both. 
But as different as the stories are, they share one central assumption—as 
beneficial as a preventive law-enforcement system might prove to be, no 
community could ever be expected to support its continued use if it were 
shown to be fallible. The primary threat driving the action in both stories is 
the fear that one of Precrime’s predictions might turn out to be wrong, and 
that once the public becomes aware of just one mistake, the deafening 
outcry of injustice would require the system’s immediate termination. Both 
the movie and the short story advance their unquestioned belief that no 
society would tolerate a system of this kind being enforced in a clearly 
fallible manner. 
But recent history, if not much of this nation’s history, suggests that this 
shared assumption might be as fanciful as the science-fiction supposition of 
precognition at the heart of both stories. Even the most cursory review of 
our national responses to real and perceived security threats demonstrates 
that, under the right circumstances, and applied to the right population of 
citizens, the majority of this nation has accepted the continued 
implementation of a preemptive detention system with dubious predictive 
reliability. It appears that society is far more willing to accept preemptive 
detention of individuals who have not yet committed a criminal act, even in 
the face of evidence of fallibility of the decision-making process that led to 
the detentions, than is assumed by either of the Minority Report stories.  
Preempting Justice   279 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
Part II of this article discusses the ways that the short story and film 
address the fundamental questions of precrime. Part III examines the use of 
preemptive action by the United States in its international policy and by law 
enforcement agencies within this country. Finally, the article concludes by 
considering the insights that the Minority Report stories offer in engaging in 
preemptive criminal justice and military actions. 
II. PRECRIME IN FICTION: TWO MINORITY REPORTS 
A.  Philip K. Dick’s “The Minority Report” 
Philip K. Dick (1928-1982) was a prolific, if somewhat obscure, science-
fiction writer and “futurist” who has received wide popular attention much 
more for the film adaptations of his short stories than for his original written 
work, starting with the overwhelming commercial and critical success of 
Ridley Scott’s 1982 Blade Runner,18 an adaptation of Dick’s story, Do 
Androids Dream of Electric Sheep.19 Perhaps as a result of the success of 
Blade Runner,20 other filmmakers have repeatedly turned to Dick’s work to 
develop screen projects, including Total Recall,21 Screamers,22 Impostor,23 
Minority Report,24 Paycheck,25 A Scanner Darkly,26 Next (from The Golden 
Man27),28 and the upcoming Radio Free Albemuth29 and The Adjustment 
Bureau.30 
Filmmakers have returned again and again to Dick’s texts because they 
are often in the short story or novella format, facilitating their transfer to the 
shorter narrative form and marketing requirements of popular cinema. The 
combination of near-future, realistic settings with high-concept scientific 
scenarios (like the memory-implanting technology of Total Recall31 or 
prescient powers of the protagonist in The Golden Man32) that characterize 
his works makes for a relatively tight and visually dynamic narrative 
structure in comparison to some of the more sprawling and cerebral texts of 
more famous and critically regarded science-fiction authors including Isaac 
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Asimov, Ray Bradbury, Orson Scott Card, Frank Herbert, and Ursula 
LeGuin. 
One of Dick’s earliest and previously most obscure works, The Minority 
Report (1956), begins with a meeting between two men, one young and one 
aging.33 The older man is John Anderton, the commissioner and founder of 
a special law enforcement unit in a near-future New York City.34 The unit, 
known as the “Precrime” unit, is special because it relies on the 
precognitive psychic abilities of a trio of human genetic “mutants” to 
predict the impending commission of crimes before they actually happen.35 
Precrime has led to a 99.8 percent reduction in the commission of felonies, 
and instances of those even planning crime have all but disappeared 
because, as Anderton notes, “the culprit knows we’ll confine him in the 
detention camp a week before he has a chance to commit the crime.”36 
The younger man is Ed Witwer, a representative of the legislative body 
who oversees Precrime and who is the newly installed “assistant” to 
Anderton.37 Anderton responds to Witwer’s arrival with severe trepidation, 
born of both the imputed authority he enjoys from his bosses in “the 
Senate” and the sense that this younger, more vital man will soon be 
pushing him out of his job.38 The frustration only grows when Anderton’s 
young wife, Lisa, who works with him at Precrime, appears to be flirting 
with Witwer.39 
Anderton successfully stifles his growing annoyance long enough to 
familiarize Witwer with Precrime’s operation.40 Witwer starts by informing 
Anderton of what he already knows: “With the aid of your precog mutants, 
you’ve boldly and successfully abolished the post-crime punitive system of 
jails and fines. As we all realize, punishment was never much of a deterrent 
and could scarcely have afforded comfort to a victim already dead.”41 
Anderton responds with what he calls the “basic legalistic drawback to the 
Precrime methodology”: 
We’re taking in individuals who have broken no law. . . . Happily 
they don’t—because we get them first, before they can commit an 
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act of violence. So the commission of the crime itself is absolute 
metaphysics. We claim they’re culpable. They, on the other hand, 
eternally claim they’re innocent. And, in a sense, they are 
innocent. In our society we have no major crimes, but we do have 
a detention camp full of would-be criminals.42 
Anderton then takes Witwer to the “Analytical Wing” where the three 
precognitive mutants (precogs) are housed in shockingly unpleasant 
conditions.43 They are held in chairs twenty-four hours a day by metal bars, 
only partially conscious.44 They are all but completely oblivious to their 
surrounding and almost completely noncommunicative with the exception 
of their incoherent babblings that are “analyzed, compared, reassembled,” 
and turned into specific predictions of future crimes.45 Witwer immediately 
expresses sympathy for the condition of the mutants and the treatment they 
receive, but Anderton is dismissive, referring to them as “monkeys”—
“What do we care? We get their prophecies. They pass on what we need.”46 
Anderton then picks up a stack of cards that have been spit out from the 
machinery with the names and information of future criminals and their 
crimes.47 While leafing somewhat aimlessly through them in the course of 
the tour, Anderton is stunned to find his name on one of the cards indicating 
that he will kill someone in the next few days.48 He takes the card before 
Witwer or anyone else can see it and puts it in his pocket—only a short-
term solution, he is well aware, because copies of the crime predictions are 
disseminated to other offices within twenty-four hours.49 Anderton’s 
immediate thought is that he is the victim of a set-up, likely engineered by 
Witwer and perhaps with the help of his wife, who seems a bit too 
interested in and familiar with the younger man for what is supposed to be 
their first meeting.50 
Anderton’s first response is panic, and he attempts to leave the Precrime 
offices but his wife stops him at the door.51 He tells her he believes a 
conspiracy is being orchestrated and shows her the card as proof that 
Witwer has manufactured the bogus murder plot.52 But Lisa hands the card 
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back to her husband and points out something he has failed to notice: while 
he is listed as a future murderer, the future victim’s name is not Witwer, as 
Anderton had assumed, but Leopold Kaplan, a name completely unfamiliar 
to Anderton.53 
Shocking as it is, the unfamiliar name does not distract Anderton from 
the more immediate concern—that he is being framed and that he has to 
find a way to avoid certain and immediate incarceration.54 But, when he 
arrives at home to prepare to implement his escape plans, he is confronted 
by a man with a gun who forces him into a limousine and drives him to a 
private home in a distant part of the metropolis.55 Anderton has been 
brought there to meet Leopold Kaplan, a retired commanding general of the 
nation’s army, who is somehow aware that the precogs have predicted that 
Anderton will kill him.56 Anderton asks what Kaplan has planned for him, 
and Kaplan notes that he cannot be planning to kill Anderton or it would 
have shown up in one of the cards at Precrime.57 Instead, his plan is to 
ensure his own safety by getting Anderton into police custody 
immediately.58 As they talk, Kaplan turns on a radio, which is broadcasting 
a report about Anderton, his predicted crime, and his apparent escape.59 
While being transported to police headquarters, Anderton is taunted by 
one of Kaplan’s men, who notes how happy the detainees will be to see the 
former head of Precrime incarcerated with them.60 The man then addresses 
the methodology of the precrime system itself, parroting Anderton’s 
defenses back at him: 
“You wouldn’t harm a hair on Kaplan’s head? For the first time in 
history, Precrime goes wrong? An innocent man is framed by one 
of those cards. Maybe there’ve been other innocent people—
right?” 
“It is quite possible,” Anderton admitted listlessly. 
“Maybe the whole system can break down. Sure, you’re not 
going to commit murder—and maybe none of them were. Is that 
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why you told Kaplan you wanted to keep yourself outside? Were 
you hoping to prove the system wrong?” 61 
Immediately following this exchange, the car carrying Anderton and his 
captors slides on the wet roadway, crashing into an oncoming truck.62 
Anderton is pulled from the wreckage by an unfamiliar man who calls 
himself Fleming and gives Anderton a packet with money, identification, 
and some other papers. Anderton tells the man that he has been the victim 
of a conspiracy, that his wife Lisa is behind it, and that he can still prove his 
innocence if only he can stay hidden and avoid killing Kaplan for another 
week.63 Before leaving Anderton to hide in the “slum section,” Fleming 
tells him to study the packet he gave him carefully, and he “may still 
survive.”64 
When Anderton looks at the contents of the packet he finds a note 
reading: “The existence of a majority logically implies a corresponding 
minority.”65 Anderton later realizes that the reference is to the reports on 
predicted events provided by the three precogs—there are three, instead of 
two or one, so that the prediction of one can be checked. If one of the other 
precogs makes the same prediction, and the third disagrees, the prediction 
made by the two is considered the “majority report” and the outlying result 
is designated the “minority report.”66 Anderton concludes, based on the note 
from Fleming, that one of the three precogs must have disagreed with the 
others about his impending murder of Kaplan, and he is determined to see 
that minority report.67 
With the help of one of his former employees, Anderton sneaks into the 
Precrime offices and finds the minority report.68 The minority report’s 
alternative conclusion—that Anderton would not kill Kaplan—apparently 
relies on the fact that Anderton happens to see the prediction before the 
murder is to occur.69 The minority report was produced after the first two 
predictions, based on additional information and, consequently, could be 
expected to be more reliable.70 Even though Anderton now has proof to 
show Witwer that he need not be incarcerated, he still distrusts Witwer and 
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dares not confront him with the minority report, which Witwer has 
undoubtedly seen as acting Commissioner.71 
Anderton’s wife finds him at Precrime.72 He tells her of the minority 
report and of the impact of the majority prediction on his actions, leading to 
this exchange: 
“I wonder how many times this has happened before.” 
“A minority report? A great many times.” 
“I mean, one precog misphased. Using the report of the others as 
data—superseding them. Perhaps a lot of the people in the camps 
are like you.” 
“No, I was in a position to see the card, to get a look at the 
report. That’s what did it.” 
“But—Perhaps all of them would have reacted that way. We 
could have told them the truth.” 
“It would have been too great a risk.”73 
As they are escaping the police offices in a helicopter, Anderton decides 
that Kaplan is the proper audience for the minority report, not Witwer who 
has, of course, already seen it.74 Once Kaplan sees it, he will no longer feel 
threatened and might use his significant influence to help Anderton avoid 
incarceration.75 
But Lisa questions the wisdom of her husband’s choice.76 “If Kaplan gets 
hold of the tape, the police will be discredited. Can’t you see why? It would 
prove that the majority report was an error. Ed Witwer is absolutely right. 
You have to be taken in—if Precrime is to survive.”77 As they argue over 
what is more important, the precrime program or his personal freedom, the 
two discover that there is a stowaway in their escape vehicle—Fleming.78 
After a brief struggle, Anderton knocks Fleming out with the butt of a gun 
and finds among his effects documentation that shows that he is an Army 
officer under Kaplan’s control.79  
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Finally, the true nature of the conspiracy becomes clear to Anderton. It 
was Kaplan who orchestrated the whole thing—once the prediction was 
made, he endeavored to ensure first that Anderton escaped, then that the 
escape and falsely-predicted murder were made public.80 Kaplan’s objective 
was exactly what Lisa warned Anderton would happen if he escaped—the 
destruction of the Precrime program based on the exposure of one false 
prediction. When Anderton learns that Kaplan has also obtained a copy of 
the minority report, he realizes that he is trapped, and he finally reaches the 
conclusion that his wife had made at the outset—he has to kill Kaplan.81 
Anderton confronts Kaplan and kills him.82 Anderton previously made a 
deal with Witwer (now aware of the Army plot to discredit Precrime) that 
he would be sent to a penal colony for the rest of his life as punishment for 
only the second murder in the nation in the last five years.83 In the aftermath 
of the murder, as Anderton and his wife are packing for their lifetime exile, 
they pause to ruminate with Witwer about the recent events and what they 
mean for the future of Precrime.84 Witwer wonders whether the events of 
the past few days demonstrate that there was something seriously wrong 
and whether the validity of the program should be reconsidered.85  
Not at all, Anderton responds.86 Indeed, if anything, the performance of 
the precogs reinforced the infallibility of the program. Each of the 
predictions was valid given the data available at the time it was made.87 The 
problems only arose, as Anderton had previously suggested to his wife, 
when he was made aware of the prediction that he would be a murderer.88  
“It can happen in only one circumstance,” Anderton tells Witwer, before 
boarding the rocket to the penal planet.89 “My case was unique, since I had 
access to the data. It could happen again—but only to the next Police 
Commissioner. So watch your step.”90 
Notwithstanding imagined and genuine conspiracies and machinations 
from various parties, the only thing that had remained pure was the 
precrime process itself—all predictions, majority and minority, had their 
own independent validity. Witwer did not have to worry. The system was 
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sound and could be expected to remain so long into the future, with the 
obvious exception of the chaos that could ensue if the machines punched 
out a card with Ed Witwer’s name on it! 
B.  Steven Spielberg’s “Minority Report” 
In 2002, Steven Spielberg directed a film entitled Minority Report,91 
loosely based on Dick’s short story. Spielberg, arguably the most 
commercially successful filmmaker of his generation, is best known for 
action and science-fiction films made earlier in his career like Jaws,92 Close 
Encounters of the Third Kind,93 Raiders of the Lost Ark,94 and E.T.: The 
Extra-Terrestrial.95 However, his more recent films, like the highly 
acclaimed Holocaust story Schindler’s List,96 Amistad,97 Saving Private 
Ryan,98 Artificial Intelligence: AI (a collaboration with Stanley Kubrick),99 
and Munich,100 have taken on more serious subjects and addressed central 
moral concerns. 
In discussing his interest in making a film from Dick’s short story, 
Spielberg told an interviewer that he always liked George Orwell’s 1984 
and was interested in addressing similar subjects in a film.101 He also noted 
that the film is “totally informed” by “all the political parallels to the post 
John Ashcroft era. How many of our civil liberties are we willing to give up 
because the government tells us we have to in order to protect ourselves 
better from terrorism in the shadow of the aftermath of 9/11?”102 
Some basic features of the mid-century story103—a law enforcement unit 
relying on precognitive mutants to predict crimes before they happen, the 
prediction that an official of that unit named Anderton would commit 
murder, and Anderton’s frantic initial attempts to escape for long enough to 
prove his future innocence—remain. Everything else, details both large and 
small, are completely different, including, perhaps most importantly, the 
ultimate fate of the precrime program itself. 
In the film, John Anderton, played by Tom Cruise, is not the aging 
commissioner of a national precrime police unit, but the young and severely 
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troubled operational chief and second-in-command of the Department of 
Precrime in Washington, D.C., in the year 2054. While the story has been 
moved from New York City to the nation’s capital, the scope of the law 
enforcement program has been reduced—Precrime is used to predict and 
prevent murder only in the District of Columbia. 
As the film begins, the nation is on the verge of a referendum to extend 
Precrime to the entire country. The film includes a decidedly believable 
version of a political commercial, with testimonials from potential future 
murder victims, telling viewers how the program saved their lives. The 
commercial begins with a voice-over asking viewers to: “Imagine a world 
without murder.” The announcer reports that within just a few months 
following the implementation of Precrime, the murder rate in Washington, 
D.C., was reduced by more than 90 percent, and within a year, murder was 
eradicated altogether. The U.S. attorney general is then shown explaining to 
the audience that his department will ensure the “utter infallibility” of the 
precrime system so as to guarantee “that which keeps us safe will also keep 
us free.” The spot closes with first one and then a chorus of the saved future 
victims saying: “Precrime—it works.” 
The precrime methodology depicted in the film is different from that in 
the book. Notably, in the film, there is a limit to the detail of the 
information the precogs provide. They give the Precrime officers the names 
of the murder victim and the assailant as well as the day and time of the 
attack. Then, the Precrime officers review images of the precogs’ visions 
projected on a large computer screen. By manipulating and scrutinizing the 
images as if they were digital video, the officers solve the future murder. 
The dramatically visual precrime mechanism of the film is deserving of 
some close attention. On its face, the choice to replace the short story’s 
decidedly low-tech computer cards with the visually expansive techno-
dance performed in the early scenes of the film by Cruise seems to serve a 
relatively obvious goal in transferring the story from page to screen. The 
film’s use of video images and heightened uncertainty of the place and time 
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of the crimes certainly provides enhanced cinematic texture and dramatic 
potential not necessary in the short-story format. 
Adept filmmakers allow important events to unfold for the audience, 
allowing the audience to “live” the story, as opposed to having them 
described by a character or narrator, wherever possible. Therefore, it is 
certainly no surprise that Spielberg, one of the great masters of the visual 
aspects of the medium, would find a much more visually compelling means 
of depicting the precog process than having one of the characters read a few 
names off a card. Additionally, this creates the edge-of-the-seat action 
sequences, so valuable for a wide-release film, that are generated by the fact 
that Cruise’s Anderton cannot quite figure out where the murder is going to 
be committed until the very last minute. 
But this change imposed by the filmmakers suggests more than aesthetic 
choices born of differences in media. The visual record of future crimes 
depicted in the film closely resembles the way consumers of our ubiquitous 
mass media experience crime in the real twenty-first century. The video of 
O.J. Simpson’s white Chevy Bronco, or any number of other car chases that 
briefly dominate the airwaves on a given afternoon, the real-time visual 
images of the  9/11 attacks, or the “shock and awe” commencement of the 
invasion of Iraq, are so familiar as to be second nature in popular culture. 
Consequently, there is an implied veracity to a precognitive crime 
prediction that comes with a handy video record which would feel right at 
home as breaking news on CNN or the Fox News Channel. Somehow, such 
a prediction would be sapped of credibility and impact if there were no 
visual record to accompany it. 
In the film’s opening scene, before Anderton can begin his pursuit of the 
cuckolded husband, he is required to provide the basic information on the 
future crime to a pair of “remote witnesses,” one apparently the chief justice 
of the United States, and the other a “doctor.” Within seconds they give 
validation of the action, and Anderton begins to “scrub” the computer-
generated image in search of the location of the murder. Nothing 
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resembling this scene, or its concern for some semblance of due process 
protections as part of this procedure, is present in the short story. It is one 
indication of the filmmakers’ alternate concerns, whose focus is less on the 
technological and logical conundrums that drive the plot in the story, and 
more on the parallels between the precrime program and the similar 
preemptive procedures that were becoming increasingly prevalent in the 
nation at the time. 
Anderton returns to the office after apprehending the future murderer to 
find Danny Witwer, an investigator sent by the attorney general in advance 
of the national referendum to ensure the infallibility of Precrime. In the 
course of giving Witwer a tour, Anderton ends up alone in the room that 
houses the precogs and witnesses an “echo” of a past murder that the female 
precog, Agatha, is experiencing. Intrigued, Anderton looks further into the 
circumstances of the murder and finds that the record of Agatha’s image of 
the event has been deleted from the precrime system. (We also find out that 
Anderton is addicted to a new high-tech drug and has fallen into a state of 
well-concealed depression, as a result of the abduction of his five-year-old 
son six years before, and the subsequent collapse of his marriage). 
After Anderton reports the gap in the records to his superior, Burgess, the 
cofounder and leader of the precrime program, Anderton finds out the 
precogs have predicted that he will kill a man named Leo Crow. Like the 
similar instance in the short story, Anderton has never heard the name of his 
supposed victim before. As he attempts to leave the office, an alarm begins 
to sound, but Anderton escapes. Searching for an explanation of what he 
assumes is a set-up perpetrated by Witwer, Anderton seeks out the other co-
founder of the precrime methodology, Dr. Iris Hinemen, a brilliant 
geneticist who has become disenchanted with the program and the way her 
former partner has administered it. 
Dr. Hinemen is particularly dissatisfied with the treatment of the precogs. 
The precogs are housed in less than ideal conditions, albeit better than those 
depicted in the short story—they spend their lives in a pool of water that 
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provides them nourishment and sedation, connected to the computer-
imaging system used by the Precrime officers. Dr. Hineman tells Anderton 
of the existence of the minority reports—“The precogs are never wrong . . . 
but occasionally they do disagree. Most of the time all three precognitives 
will see an event in the same way, but once in a while one of them will see 
things differently than the other two.” Anderton asks why he was never told 
of the existence of the minority reports, and Hinemen responds: 
Because these minority reports are destroyed the instant that they 
occur. Obviously, for Precrime to function there can’t be any 
suggestion of fallibility. Who wants a justice system that instills 
doubt? It may be reasonable, but it is still doubt. . . . I’m saying 
that every so often those accused of a precrime might have an 
alternate future. 
Anderton is devastated by the news of the minority reports and the fact 
that he has incarcerated people who might have had alternate futures in 
which they did not commit the predicted crimes. 
The somewhat heavy-handed irony of his current circumstances—that 
not only has he been incarcerating people who may be “innocent” but he’s 
also now the one falsely accused of a crime he’s convinced he would never 
commit—adds texture, albeit somewhat heavily and predictably, to the 
dramatic narrative. And it is no surprise that the film retains this aspect of 
the short story. The unavoidable plot point of a story about a crime 
predicting technology is a flaw, or potential flaw, in the system. The 
decision to have the consequences of that flaw fall on the protagonist of the 
story draws in the reader or audience and creates the highest level of 
empathy. It is this empathy for the potentially innocent victims of precrime 
prosecution and detention that makes it so important that no flaw in the 
system ever be exposed. Such exposure would be expected to produce some 
version of a “that could happen to me” response from a majority of the 
population that would certainly ensure the defeat of the pending national 
referendum in the film. But, if someone less connected to the audience, 
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producing a diminished sense of commonality with the majority of the 
public, were to fall victim to an obvious flaw in the system, it is unclear if 
the lack of empathy would produce a similar negative response. 
But the news of the minority report, in addition to undermining 
Anderton’s faith in the program, also provides some hope for his escape and 
much of the film’s second act, as Anderton sets out to find the alleged 
minority report of his predicted crime. Hinemen tells him that while the 
records of the minority reports are immediately destroyed, the original is 
always available at the source—the precog who created it. So, Anderton 
returns to the Precrime office and is forced to take the precog, Agatha, with 
him as he again escapes. He takes her to an underground computer expert to 
extract more information about the predicted murder. In viewing her 
prediction, he sees that there is no minority report—her account of his 
future murder is the same as the others. But while there now appears to be 
irrefutable evidence that he is going to commit murder, Anderton still 
knows nothing about the man he is destined to kill. 
Soon thereafter, he and Agatha come upon the building depicted in her 
prediction, and find Crow listed in the registry. Agatha begs Anderton not 
to confront him: “You still have a choice, the others never saw their future.” 
But Anderton has to find out what happened to his life and why; he assures 
her with complete sincerity that he will certainly not kill a man he does not 
even know. However, upon entering Crow’s empty room, Anderton finds 
evidence in the form of pictures that Crow was the man who abducted and, 
almost certainly, murdered Anderton’s lost son, along with seemingly many 
other children. Crow returns, and in the course of being beaten by Anderton, 
confesses to the crime. But as the time passes for the predicted murder, 
Anderton does not shoot Crow and arrests him instead, even reading him his 
rights in a nod to present-day-pop-culture depictions of law enforcement 
activities. 
But, as Anderton is taking Crow into custody, the man changes his story.  
Crow claims that he was an incarcerated prisoner and was offered a deal. If 
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he pretended to be the man who abducted Anderton’s son, and Anderton 
subsequently killed him, Crow’s family would be protected and provided 
for. He proceeds to beg Anderton to kill him so that his family will receive 
the promised help.  Anderton refuses, at which point Crow grabs 
Anderton’s gun and shoots himself in a way that looks identical to the 
predicted crime. 
In the film version, it seems as though the predictions of Anderton’s 
future crime are completely valid, except for two things: first, he does not 
commit the crime, although the circumstances look the same as the 
predicted occurrences; and second, he finds out he has been the victim of an 
attempted conspiracy—that unlike the short story, someone was successful 
in manipulating Precrime’s methodology. As Anderton investigates who set 
him up, he uncovers a much greater and more extensive compromise to the 
precrime system.  He discovers that Burgess found a way to deceive the 
system by staging crimes seemingly so identical to ones previously 
predicted, that they look to the Precrime officials as mere echoes of prior 
predictions that the precogs were reliving. The murder with the absent file 
that Anderton had discovered earlier in the film and told his boss about, was 
actually a murder that Burgess committed and covered up—he had killed 
Agatha’s mother because she was demanding to have her daughter returned 
to her. 
Just as Anderton realizes what has happened and what his boss has done, 
Anderton is finally captured by his former colleagues. He escapes to 
confront Burgess at the celebration for the national extension of the 
Precrime program with the visual image of the actual crime. Anderton 
goads Burgess to shoot him, an apparent future murder that the now-
reactivated precogs see and document. Burgess is, thus, given a similar 
choice as the Anderton character in the short story—to kill Anderton and be 
incarcerated for life, or refrain from killing him and prove Precrime to be 
fallible. Burgess makes a very different choice, however, resolving his 
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dilemma by killing himself and the program. The closing voice-over 
informs the audience that: 
[The] Precrime experiment was abandoned. All prisoners were 
unconditionally pardoned and released, although police 
departments keep watch on many of them for years to come. 
Agatha and the twins were transferred to an undisclosed location. 
A place where they could find relief from their gifts. A place 
where they could live out their lives in peace. 
C.   Decoding the Short Story and Film: Messages, Cautions, and Shared 
Illusions 
The short story and the film of Minority Report approach the issues posed 
by the possibility of reliable prediction of future criminal acts in very 
different ways and reach remarkably different conclusions. As the short 
story concludes, the precrime system is still in place and, perhaps, more 
credible than ever, as the prescient visions of all the precogs are finally 
validated for the confused characters and all fears of the potential corruption 
and deception infecting the system are proven to be mistaken.104 The central 
dramatic conflict of Dick’s story is not the moral and ethical dilemmas that 
Precrime introduces, to which Dick offers only a glimpse, but rather the 
internal battle within Anderton and his decision whether to save himself or 
save the one thing that has given his life meaning.105 
In the end, his choice to save Precrime is validated by the renewed 
respect of his beautiful wife, who chooses to join him in exile, and the 
revitalization of the program itself, with the one caveat that the next 
Commissioner better be careful about what he plans to do.106 The possibility 
that the system may have been convicting innocent people all along, or that 
those future criminals could be informed of the predictions and given the 
chance to avoid their fate, are again undermined by the resolution of the 
short story. All the reader is left with is a sense of pathos for the precogs 
themselves, muted as it is by Dick’s lack of intense focus on their situation. 
Readers are, of course, free to decode other kinds of messages from the text, 
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bringing into sharper relief some of the issues that are raised—the options 
of stopping the predicted crimes short of incarcerating the future criminals 
or the idea that more people may have chosen to change their actions if they 
were made aware of the precognitive prediction—but Dick seems most 
interested in the imagined technology itself and the perplexing paradox that 
Anderton first finds himself in, followed by his unconventional and 
dramatic escape. 
In the hands of Spielberg and his collaborators, the encoded message 
provides a far more cautionary note to the precrime methodology and the 
similar real-life, law-enforcement techniques beginning to take hold at the 
time of the making of the film. In the film, Precrime is abandoned, not 
because of the ineffectiveness of the technology, but because it, like any 
other intelligence enterprise, is subject to both abuse and manipulation by 
those  in power.107 Spielberg’s team also seems more interested in the lives 
of the precogs themselves and the moral implications of deriving a greater 
good from the exploitation or abuse of a minority.108 
Perhaps most significantly, the film expresses a willingness to trade the 
indubitable benefits of a “world without murder” for a world where a small 
number of possibly innocent people are convicted, along with many more 
who are, or at least certainly will be, guilty.109 The release of all of the 
“murderers” convicted under the system, particularly in light of the relative 
certainty that most, if not all, of them would have committed their predicted 
crime is perhaps the strongest message encoded by the filmmakers, and 
perhaps the most optimistic.110 It depicts their conclusion that the risks 
inherent in a precrime program are not justifiable if there is even a chance 
that the innocent are punished as well as the guilty.111 Perhaps it is sufficient 
to monitor those we suspect of intent to commit illegal actions and let them 
know they are under surveillance. 
But compelling as this resolution is, it seems unduly optimistic given 
what our nation has experienced in the years since the film’s release, as well 
as the years and decades that preceded it. While the majority of citizens 
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responded quite negatively to the revelations of the flawed predictions that 
led to our involvement in the war in Iraq, our society has proven itself far 
more willing to accept preemptive detention of individuals who have not yet 
committed a criminal act, even in the face of evidence that the decision-
making process leading to the detentions is fallible. Perhaps it is the lack of 
empathy, so central in both the story and the film, for those burdened by the 
preemptive system that explains present (and past) willingness to let these 
programs continue. 
III.  PRECRIME IN FACT: THE NEW PREEMPTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
REGIME 
A. Preemptive Action on the International Stage 
As Steven Spielberg noted in an interview, the preemptive international 
and domestic response policy of the United States after 9/11 parallels the 
fictional precrime program of the Minority Report stories.112 Immediately 
after the terrorist attacks, U.S. law enforcement officials publicly 
acknowledged an important shift in their defining mission.113 In an 
interview on Meet the Press five days after the attacks, the Bush 
administration’s point man on post-9/11 law enforcement policy, Vice 
President Dick Cheney, stated the nature of this shift in intentionally vague 
terms.114 The tragic and traumatic events of that day suggested to politicians 
and policymakers alike that it might no longer be enough for law 
enforcement agencies, like the FBI, to focus on investigating crime and 
apprehending criminals. 
In the days and weeks that followed, “the Attorney General and the FBI 
Director . . . elevated counterterrorism and the prevention of future terrorist 
attacks against the United States interests as the top priority of the 
[Department of Justice (DOJ)] and the FBI.”115 On October 25, 2001, 
Attorney General John Ashcroft articulated that the DOJ’s “single 
objective” was preventing “terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists 
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off the street.”116 And, former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson 
described this new focus to the Office of Inspector General “as a huge 
paradigm shift within the DOJ from prosecution to prevention,” while 
“other high-level DOJ and FBI officials told [the Office of the Inspector 
General] that after September 11, they worked to transform the FBI into an 
organization that would prevent attacks as opposed to react to attacks.”117 
This new prevention focus became a central component of the Bush 
administration’s foreign and national security policies. After an almost 
immediate decision to attack the Taliban forces in Afghanistan—which 
were seen as responsible in some identifiable way for the  9/11 attacks118— 
the Bush administration then turned to Iraq as a potential target for military 
action. The administration articulated the justification for invading Iraq, in 
part, by referencing the potential future threat it might pose to the United 
States and its allies.119 In a September 8, 2002 interview on Meet the Press, 
Vice President Cheney alleged that Saddam Hussein was moving 
aggressively to add nuclear weapons to an existing stockpile of chemical 
and biological weapons, adding that “the United States may well become 
the target of those activities.”120 Then National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice summarized this concern with her famous statement, 
repeated on various appearances on national television, that the United 
States would not allow for the “smoking gun,” demonstrating conclusively 
that Iraq had an effective program for producing weapons of mass 
destruction, to later come in the form of the “mushroom cloud” of an Iraqi 
nuclear weapon.121 
Then Secretary of State Colin Powell made a highly detailed presentation 
to the United Nations that reliable intelligence proved there was no doubt 
that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and it was in 
the process of developing new ones.122 The power of this message to the 
American people was enhanced by a compliant mainstream media that 
offered little, if any, contrary evidence to challenge the administration’s 
description of a dangerous Iraq and, instead, offered a consistent and 
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unmistakable attitude of support for the increasingly inevitable war.123 On 
the basis of this powerful narrative—that Iraq posed a future threat to the 
United States as result of the combination of its dangerously unpredictable 
leadership and its weapons of mass destruction—the United States invaded 
Iraq in March of 2003.124 
After the invasion, when no weapons of mass destruction (or even 
programs that might have produced them in the near future) were found, 
one of the central foundations of public support for the war disappeared. 
When the war was far more costly (in both lives and resources) and far 
more complex than the administration had led anyone to believe it would 
be, public support collapsed in much the way the author and director of the 
Minority Report story and film would have expected it would.125 
B.  Domestic Preemptive Criminal Prosecution 
The new preventative law-enforcement policy has produced important 
domestic consequences as well. During the time period immediately 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks, the focus of domestic law enforcement 
was on, among other things, the identification of potential terrorist threats 
and the development of short- and long-term solutions to diffuse their 
potential to cause future harm.  
In 2002, the U.S. military set up a detention facility on a Marine base in 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to detain prisoners captured during the 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars who were considered to pose a risk of future 
violent activity. 126 Prisoners continue to be held in the facility for an 
indefinite period of time, without charge, and without access to legal 
representation.127 Between 2002 and 2010, 779 prisoners, referred to as 
“enemy combatants” by the Bush administration, were brought to 
Guantánamo and approximately five hundred have been released without 
charges.128 Of the 245 detainees that remained in the facility as of spring 
2010, several have been cleared for release, but countries have not been 
found willing to accept them.129  
298 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
INFLUENTIAL VOICES 
The Bush and Obama130 administrations assert that because the detainees 
pose a particular threat of future attack to citizens of the United States or the 
nation’s interests, they should remain confined.131 However, this assertion is 
unsupported by any evidence disclosed either publicly, before a grand jury, 
or at trial.132 In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
that the detainees could not be kept permanently without charge and a legal 
proceeding to determine their guilt had to be made available to them.133 
Enemy combatants taken off of the battlefield in Afghanistan were not 
the only potential terrorists detained during this period. In addition to the 
Liberty City Seven,134 hundreds of other suspected terrorists, or future 
terrorists, have been apprehended in the United  States and abroad since 
9/11. Perhaps the most famous is Jose Padilla, an American citizen who was 
arrested at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago on suspicion of having 
an interest in committing a future terrorist act.135 These “detainees” were 
immediately incarcerated at Guantánamo Bay or similar facilities set up for 
American citizens like Padilla and given no access to an attorney, nor 
charged, nor provided other justification of their detention.136 
Padilla was detained on the grounds that he was allegedly taking part in 
an Al Qaeda plot to detonate a “dirty bomb” in the United States.137 He was 
confined in a military facility in the United States in solitary confinement 
for three years as a designated enemy combatant.138 Then, in November 
2005, the DOJ announced that criminal charges were being filed against 
Padilla in Miami.139 These charges did not allege any dirty bomb related 
activities.140 He was charged, instead, with “being part of a ‘North 
American support cell’ that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from 1993 to 2001.”141 Padilla was 
convicted pursuant to the new indictment and sentenced to seventeen years 
in prison.142 
The post-9/11 detention of terror suspects is not this nation’s first such 
response to a perceived security threat, however.143 In 1941, after the 
Japanese attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, negative 
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public attention was immediately focused on Japanese Americans, who had 
already been the victims of discriminatory treatment for generations.144 As 
Professor Lorraine Bannai has observed, “[t]he popular press was quick to 
blame Japanese Americans for Pearl Harbor,” and it soon began “to call for 
the removal of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. Both state and 
federal legislators joined in the call” with one California congressman 
arguing that if a citizen of Japanese descent “wants to make his 
contribution, [he] will submit himself to a concentration camp.”145 
Just two months after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Roosevelt signed 
an executive order authorizing the detention of more than one hundred 
thousand Americans of Japanese descent and Japanese immigrants living in 
the United States.146 The detainees were sent to ten camps, called 
“relocation centers,” in the western and southern United States.147 While the 
internment began only after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the motivations for 
the action can be seen in “anti-Japanese sentiment among farmers who 
competed against Japanese labor, [and] politicians who sided with anti-
Japanese constituencies” long before the attack.148  
Professor Keith Aoki has discussed one major legal component of the 
pre-Pearl Harbor discrimination against Americans of Japanese ancestry—
the Alien Land Laws of the early twentieth century.149 Aoki notes that 
“[t]hese laws linked the virulent nineteenth century Sinophobia that 
culminated in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act with the mass internment of 
Japanese Americans in the mid-twentieth century” by barring “‘aliens 
ineligible to citizenship’ from owning fee simple title in agricultural land 
and prohibited leases for such land lasting longer than three years.”150 As 
Aoki observes, the “salient point of these laws was their strongly racialist 
basis,” motivated in part “by a xenophobic paranoia” that John Higham151 
has called “racial nativism,” which “depended upon the existence in the 
popular U.S. imagination of a racial ‘link’ between the reviled Chinese 
immigrants of the nineteenth century and the Japanese immigrants of the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.”152 In making the connection 
300 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
INFLUENTIAL VOICES 
between the Alien Land Laws and the World War II internment, Aoki 
argues that understanding the former “empowers us to comprehend the 
depth and scope of the practices and institutionalized subordination that 
helped make the racial scapegoating of the internment possible.”153 
After a time, detainees were offered the opportunity to leave the camps if 
they enlisted in the American military.154 Ironic and insulting as such an 
offer was, given the supposed national security threat posed by the 
detainees, as many as twelve hundred detainees enlisted as a result.155 
Finally, in 1944, President Roosevelt rescinded the internment order, and 
the last camps were closed by 1945.156 
C.  Legal Implications of Preemptive Action 
The express justifications for these preemptive criminal or security-based 
detentions are grounded in the undeniably valid impulse to avoid security 
risks to the public. But as Professor Robert Chesney recently observed in 
addressing the post-9/11 detentions, 
[T]he nature of prosecutorial intervention in these and other 
terrorism-related cases has not been welcomed in every quarter. 
The prospect that the government has adopted a policy of 
prosecuting suspected terrorists at the earliest available opportunity 
has generated criticism from both civil liberties and national 
security perspectives, with the former contending that we risk 
prosecuting dissenting thought uncoupled from culpable action and 
the latter contending that such a policy would sacrifice the benefits 
of additional intelligence and evidence gathering.157 
Chesney notes that the civil liberties concerns he cites are well-illustrated 
in the Minority Report film, with its presentation of precrime as a “law 
enforcement fantasy” where “all criminal harms are averted, without any 
false positives in the form of persons wrongly accused.”158 He notes that in 
reality, and even in the film, this paradigm is indeed a fantasy, and that “the 
problem of false positives cannot be avoided” in any criminal justice 
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system.159 But while unavoidable, the degree of risk of erroneous 
prosecution: 
is not uniform across all types of criminal liability. The farther one 
moves from the paradigm of a completed act—as one moves 
backwards successively through attempt, to advanced planning, to 
initial planning, and so forth—the more tenuous the link between 
the defendant and the anticipated harm becomes and, hence, the 
more likely it is that false positives will be generated.160 
As observed by David Cole, although the United States has not gone so 
far as to enact “a ‘pre-crime’ law that allows the government to arrest and 
prosecute people before they commit their crimes” as in Minority Report, 
recent law has allowed law enforcement to move in that direction.161 The 
criminal prosecution of the Liberty City Seven for allegedly providing 
“material support” for terrorism is one such example.162 The 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was rarely used until after 
9/11; however, it “allows the government to obtain a ‘terrorist’ conviction 
without establishing that an individual engaged in any terrorism, conspired 
to engage in any terrorism, aided or abetted terrorism, or even intended to 
further terrorism.”163 
This kind of prosecution institutionalizes a new way of thinking about 
criminal law, changing the focus from the investigation and prosecution of 
those who commit harmful acts to the prevention of those acts before they 
occur.164 Our criminal law regime has long contained categories of offenses 
such as attempt and conspiracy that do not require the completion of the 
ultimate objective of the criminal. But even a conspiracy charge 
traditionally requires some overt act in the furtherance of the criminal 
agreement (and not merely the agreement alone).165 Further, the elements of 
an attempt crime are not traditionally demonstrated until it can be shown 
that the defendant has taken some sort of action beyond the decision to 
commit a criminal act.166 
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The reasons for this kind of limitation on the scope of criminal 
prosecution are clear. Absent an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy or 
an action beyond a decision to commit a crime in an attempt, sufficient 
uncertainty remains as to whether the potential criminal would have gone 
forward with the intended act. In an attempt crime when an action has been 
taken to further the ultimate objective, even when the goal is not achieved, 
there is no doubt as to whether the person would have gone through with 
what was intended. But criminal intent alone has not traditionally provided 
the basis for prosecution and incarceration in our system.167 
Robert Batey, in his analysis of the law of attempt in the context of the 
Minority Report story, notes that “Anglo-American courts have made it 
very difficult to satisfy the act requirement for attempt, in order to allow for 
changes of the heart like Anderton’s [in the film].”168 Noting the vagaries of 
how “attempt” has been defined over time, Batey observes that while the 
common law approach has generally required “the granting of a large locus 
poenitentiae” (or “chicken-out zone”) in which “the devil may lose the 
contest” for the free will of the potential criminal, the Modern Penal Code 
requires “proof only of a ‘substantial step’ toward commission of the crime 
. . . that is ‘strongly corroborative’ of the defendant’s criminal intent.”169 
But the post-9/11 law enforcement policies seek to identify and incarcerate 
potential criminals long before either version of the crime of “attempt” has 
been demonstrated. Professor Robert Chesney recently posed the question: 
where along “a continuum that runs from contemplation to completion of a 
criminal act,” should criminal culpability lie “involving potential acts of 
terrorism?”170 
In the two Minority Report stories, assuming the efficacy of the 
predictive technology, this problem of uncertainty is removed.171 There is 
no longer any need to wait and see if the person would have committed the 
crime; we have already seen it happen through the eyes of the precogs.172 
But in the real life version of precrime prosecution, there rarely exists 
anything even approaching this level of predictive certainty.173 
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Consequently, the “risk of unnecessarily detaining innocent people is high,” 
as the inclination of law enforcement officials will likely lead them to be 
safe, rather than sorry.174 And it is similarly likely that an erroneous 
detention will be perpetuated, as there are limited incentives for a judge to 
release a detainee given the devastating consequences if the person were to 
go on to commit a crime and strong counter-incentives to take no action at 
all.175 
In the case of the Liberty City Seven, for example, not only is it 
metaphysically uncertain that the band of aspirational terrorists would have 
even attempted to blow up the Sears Tower, but the facts demonstrate that 
there was little, if any, chance that they could have committed the kinds of 
terrorists acts they had discussed. 176 
IV. WITHER PRECRIME: REAL LIFE LESSONS FROM FICTION 
So what insights have these two texts offered us in addressing the 
questions posed at the beginning of this article: What level of certainty that 
a crime is on the verge of being committed will justify apprehension and 
prosecution of a would-be criminal or the decision to engage in aggressive 
military action? What level of fallibility in the predictive process will be 
acceptable to the law enforcement community and the public? And, what 
kind of punishment, if any, is appropriate for someone who is prevented 
from committing a crime even if we are somehow sure that he or she would 
have committed it absent the intervention? 
The lessons from the two texts strongly indicate that if our government is 
going to engage in preemptive criminal investigation or military action, it 
will need a much higher level of certainty in regard to our predictive 
intelligence than has been previously demonstrated.177 The motivations and 
justifications for the decision to go to war in Iraq, if not Afghanistan, and 
for the establishment of permanent detention facilities for suspected 
terrorists, are identical to those that initiated precrime procedures in both 
the short story and the film. As Witwer notes at the beginning of the story, 
304 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
INFLUENTIAL VOICES 
“punishment . . . could scarcely have afforded comfort to a victim already 
dead.”178 Similarly, the sense that apprehending criminals after their crimes 
are committed is unsatisfactory in a society traumatized by violent crime—
that given the horrific nature of the threat, post-crime investigation and 
incarceration would not be sufficient—seemed to dominate the popular 
consciousness of the United States in the immediate post-9/11 period and to 
foster a dramatic shift away from law enforcement to crime prevention. 
Despite this shift in popular sentiment, the risk of detention of the innocent 
(and those who could be counted on to remain innocent) seems severe in the 
absence of more certain means of prediction, such as those applied in the 
fictional stories. 
But even assuming we had better intelligence and a more reasonably 
reliable means of predicting future criminals or future international threats, 
what should be done with this information? The prospect of incarceration or 
invasion under these circumstances (particularly indefinite incarceration) 
seems excessively harsh, particularly in light of several available 
alternatives such as surveillance or containment. Both the short story and 
the film offer alternatives to the perpetual incarceration for future criminal 
acts—in the story, at least some of the precriminals are offered banishment 
to a primitive colony; while in the film, once the corruption in the program 
is exposed, the detainees are freed, but are put under special surveillance for 
a period of time. The lesson from both stories is that the benefits that may 
arise from early prediction of potential threats can be attained through an 
apparatus that is less detentive than the one currently in place, namely the 
Guantánamo Bay detention facility. 
One question for which neither story provides a satisfying answer, 
however, is why, or whether, it is to be expected that members of a 
community would abandon this kind of crime prevention procedure simply 
because it had the potential to identify some innocents along with the mass 
of guilty or “pre-guilty.” The essentially unchallenged assumption that the 
public would not support a flawed system appears to have two distinct 
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components. First, as odd and magical as the process might seem, if it could 
really be shown that the prediction of criminal acts were valid, there would 
be widespread support for not only preventing the crimes, but also 
incarcerating predicted criminals, even though, by definition, they never 
actually did anything wrong. And second, if there was even the possibility 
that this procedure could lead to the incarceration of people who were not 
going to do anything wrong, it would somehow be an anathema. Not that 
something should be done to address the flaw and compensate for the small 
percentage of mistakes, but the entire procedure must be essentially perfect 
or abandoned altogether. 
Recent history has offered a mixed response to these questions. The 
absence of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (or even the discovery 
of any existing programs for their creation) demonstrated the falsity of the 
articulated premise for the war. Recent revelations from participants in the 
deliberation process leading up to the second Iraq war report a lack of 
unanimity about the level of threat posed by Iraq, both within the Bush 
administration179 and from our main Iraq War ally, Great Britain.180 Much 
like the precrime methodology in both the story and film, the dissenting 
opinions—the real life version of the minority reports—were apparently 
dismissed in favor of the “majority” opinion. And these facts, once 
revealed, resulted in the expected collapse of support for the decision to 
invade Iraq and have, perhaps, diminished enthusiasm for other similar or 
possible actions. 
But there has not been a similar public backlash in light of revelations of 
flaws in the detention regime for enemy combatants and other suspected 
terrorists, or exposed problems in the broader criminal prosecution 
dynamic. Recent and highly publicized instances of exonerations of 
convicted felons,181 including death row inmates, have not resulted in a 
national outcry to end the death penalty,182 as assumed by the filmmakers 
and, presumably, the audience. 
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Perhaps the most interesting product of application of the allegorical tales 
in the two texts to the real life forays into precrime is the capacity of both 
government officials, and seemingly large portions of the public, to accept 
the prosecution of crimes that have not occurred and of criminals who have 
not yet done anything, in the interest of avoiding future catastrophes like 
those of 9/11. Even though it has been demonstrated that at least some of 
the Guantánamo detainees were detained based on erroneous identification 
and had no connection to terrorist activities,183 subsequent calls in some 
circles to disband the camp and either release or try the remaining prisoners 
have been largely ignored. The program continues, and there does not 
appear to be a strong public outcry against it. 
The most dramatic and disturbing divergence from the narratives of the 
Minority Report stories and the post-9/11 reality is the fact that the 
American public as a whole appears to have little concern about the 
possibility (and indeed the certainty) that innocent or likely innocent people 
are being incarcerated, indefinitely, without evidence or charge. In the short 
story—and to a much greater extent, the film—the narrative tension rests on 
the assumption that no matter how impressive and salutary the precrime 
technology and methodology might be, exposure of even one mistake, one 
instance of an innocent person being identified and incarcerated by the 
system,  would be fatal to the program. Following the story, there would be 
such an outcry and, indeed, an admission on the part of the officials 
responsible for the program themselves that a crime-predicting mechanism 
could not be allowed to continue absent a clear demonstration of its 
infallibility. If not, the unstated argument clearly runs, even one wrongly 
accused innocent party would be enough to counterbalance all the perceived 
and actual benefits of the law enforcement program. 
Perhaps the Japanese internment is a particularly instructive comparison 
to help explain the absence of broad public outrage about our current 
internment regime. The combination of the broad fear of severe threat to 
public safety and the ability to focus that fear on a small, identifiable 
Preempting Justice   307 
VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010 
portion of society that can be alien in some essential way may explain an 
absence of empathy that might otherwise foster more concern about the 
indefinite detention of precriminals. Perhaps the same social dynamics that 
led to calls for racial profiling in the wake of the 9/11, but not the 
Oklahoma City attacks, and for detention of those who might appear to 
some to be “illegal” on our southern (as opposed to northern) border, help 
explain why such a questionable detention regime could survive in this 
freedom-loving nation for so long. 
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